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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Michael Ian Kramer appeals from the district court's appellate ruling
affirming Kramer's conviction for driving under the influence.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Kramer with DUI, carrying a concealed weapon while
under the influence, and transporting an open container. (R., pp. 38-40.) After
the jury had been sworn Kramer moved to exclude certain documentary evidence
about calibration of the breath-testing instrument based on a claim that it had not
been timely disclosed to the defense. (Trial Tr., p. 1, L. 6; p. 4, L. 25 - p. 5, L.
17; p. 8, L. 16 - p. 9, L. 22; p. 15, Ls. 9-15.)

Kramer's trial counsel

acknowledged having made no effort to obtain the documents despite knowledge
of their existence, asserting that he assumed that the prosecution did not intend
to use the breath test against his client because the prosecution had not provided
the documents. (Trial Tr., p. 9, L. 23 - p. 11, L. 19.) Kramer also asserted that
admission of the documents would violate his confrontation rights. (Trial Tr., p.
11, L. 20-p.15, L. 8; p. 15, L. 15-p. 16, L.15.)
In ruling on the motions, the trial court stated that it would grant a recess
to discuss the matter with a potential state witness regarding calibration before
he was called.

(Trial Tr., p. 25, Ls. 8-19.) This expert, however, was never

called at trial. (Trial Tr., Index.) The trial court also distinguished the authority
cited by the defense noting that there was a difference between calibration of
testing equipment and an affidavit that the substance in question is cocaine.
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(Trial Tr., p. 25, L. 19 - p. 26, L. 12.) The court also allowed the defense to
preserve any foundational issues and raise them during the trial. (Trial Tr., p. 26,
Ls. 12-14.)
At trial the state moved for admission of State's Exhibit 2, which
apparently included the calibration documents.

(Trial Tr., p. 131, Ls. 18-19.)

Kramer renewed his confrontation objection. (Trial Tr., p. 131, L. 20 - p. 133, L.
21.) The trial court overruled the objection. (Trial Tr., p. 133, L. 22 - p. 134, L. 2.)
The jury convicted Kramer on the open container and DUI counts, but
acquitted on the concealed weapon charge.

(R., pp. 176-78.) Kramer timely

appealed the judgment to the district court. (R., pp. 184-89.) The district court
affirmed and Kramer appealed to this Court. (R., pp. 253-76.)

2

ISSUES
Kramer states the issues on appeal as:
A.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in admitting the
breath test certificates to lay a foundation for the breath test
where the prosecution failed to timely disclose certificates
after the defense filed a timely discovery demand?

B.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in admitting the
breath test certificates to lay a foundation for the breath test
in violation of the defendant's right of confrontation under the
Sixth Amendment, Crawford v. Washington, Melendez-Diaz,
and Bui/coming v. New Mexico?

(Appellant's brief, pp. 11-12 (balding omitted).)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

The trial court declined to exclude evidence as a discovery sanction. Has
Kramer failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion?

2.

The trial court overruled an objection that admission of documents
regarding calibration of the lntoxilyzer 5000 violated the Confrontation
Clause unless those documents were presented through live testimony.
Has Kramer failed to show that admission of documents prepared in the
regular course of maintenance of the lntoxilyzer 5000 violated the
Confrontation Clause?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Kramer Has Failed To Show That The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion When It
Declined To Exclude Evidence As A Discovery Sanction

A.

Introduction
The record shows that the state timely disclosed the lntoxilyzer 5000 test

results, about a year before trial. (R., pp. 21-23; Trial Tr., p. 18, Ls. 16-23.) The
prosecutor stated that she forwarded the calibration documents upon receiving
them earlier the week of trial, even though there was no request for such
documents in the discovery requests served by Kramer. (Trial Tr., p. 18, L. 21 p. 19, L. 8.)

Kramer's counsel acknowledged making no effort to secure the

calibration documents, either by obtaining copies from other sources or by filing a
motion to compel. (Trial Tr., p. 9, L. 23 - p. 11, L. 19.) Rather, Kramer's counsel
stated he merely "anticipated" that the state would not seek to admit the breath
testresultattrial. (Trial Tr., p.11, Ls.13-19.)
At no point did the trial court hold that the prosecution violated discovery
requirements.

(See generally Trial Tr.)

The trial court did state that if the

prosecution relied upon a newly disclosed expert to establish calibration of the
lntoxilyzer 5000 that it would consider granting additional time for the defense to
interview that witness.

(Trial Tr., p. 25, L. 6 - p. 26, L. 14.)

That expert,

however, did not testify at trial. (Trial Tr., Index.) The trial court also imposed no
sanction.
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On appeal Kramer generally claims that there was a discovery violation
and that it deprived him of a fair trial. (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-15.) His claims of
error and prejudice are without merit.

B.

Standard Of Review
What sanction to impose for a discovery violation is within the discretion of

the trial court, and the exercise of that discretion "'is beyond the purview of a
reviewing court unless it has been clearly abused."' State v. Stradley, 127 Idaho
203, 208, 899 P.2d 416, 421 (1995) (quoting State v. Buss, 98 Idaho 173, 174,
560 P.2d 495, 496 (1977)). See also State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 104, 175
P.3d 788, 793 (2008). A clear abuse of discretion will be found only where the
court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
State v. Bird, 119 Idaho 196, 198, 804 P.2d 925, 927 (Ct. App. 1990).

C.

Kramer Has Failed To Show Either A Discovery Violation Or Prejudice
A trial court may, within its discretion, impose sanctions for discovery

violations. I.C.R. 16(e); State v. Stradley, 127 Idaho 203,208, 899 P.2d 416,421
(1995); State v. Winson, 129 Idaho 298, 302, 923 P.2d 1005, 1009 (Ct. App
1996).

In determining an appropriate sanction, the court should consider the

prejudice suffered by the party alleging the discovery violation.

Cf. State v.

Saxton, 133 Idaho 546, 548, 989 P.2d 288, 290 (Ct. App. 1999).
"[S]ome balancing of the equities and some consideration of the
efficacy of lesser sanctions must precede a trial court's imposition
of a sanction which will significantly impair a party's ability to
present its case on the merits at trial. Borrowing from Justice
Donaldson's concurrence in [Southern Idaho Production Credit
Ass'n v. Astorquia, 113 Idaho 526, 746 P.2d 985 (1987)], we hold
5

that a trial court, 'must balance the equities by comparing the
culpability of the disobedient party with the resulting prejudice to the
innocent party.' Astorquia, 113 Idaho at 532, 746 P.2d at 990.
Second, a trial court should not impose a sanction that will prevent
full adjudication of a case on the merits without having first
considered lesser sanctions and having reached a conclusion,
supported by the record, that lesser sanctions would be ineffective
or inadequate."
Milburn v. State, 135 Idaho 701, 705, 23 P.3d 775, 779 (Ct. App. 2000) (quoting
Roe v. Doe, 129 Idaho 663, 668, 931 P.2d 657, 662 (Ct. App. 1996)). See also,
Saxton, 133 Idaho at 548, 989 P.2d at 290 ("The court is also obligated to
consider less severe remedies, such as a short continuance, a mistrial, or
imposition of sanctions ... that might serve as an alternative to excluding the
evidence.")

Furthermore, "the imposition of discovery sanctions is to be the

result of an exercise of reason by the trial court, not limited to those suggested by
the attorneys." Winson, 129 Idaho at 303,923 P.2d at 1010.
A party seeking the exclusion of evidence as a sanction for a discovery
violation must establish prejudice. Roe v. Doe, 129 Idaho 663, 668, 931 P.2d
657, 662 (Ct. App. 1996). "Where a late-disclosed witness has been allowed to
testify despite the defendant's objection to the untimely disclosure, [the appellate
court] will not reverse in the absence of a showing that the delayed disclosure
prejudiced the defendant's preparation or presentation of his defense." State v.
Allen, 145 Idaho 183, 185, 177 P.3d 397, 399 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v.
Byington, 132 Idaho 589, 592, 977 P.2d 203, 206 (1999); State v. Pizzuto, 119
Idaho 742, 751, 810 P.2d 680, 689 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State
v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,432, 825 P.2d 1081, 1088 (1991); State v. Johnson, 132
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Idaho 726, 728, 979 P.2d 128, 130 (Ct. App. 1999)). As explained by the Court
of Appeals:
The prejudice to be considered is impairment of the defendant's
ability to defend himself at trial caused by the untimeliness of the
disclosure of witnesses or evidence. Our appellate courts have
often said that, when an issue of late disclosure of prosecution
evidence is presented, "the inquiry on appeal is whether the
lateness of the disclosure so prejudiced the defendant's preparation
or presentation of his defense that he was prevented from receiving
his constitutionally guaranteed fair trial. This ordinarily requires that
the complaining party demonstrate that the late disclosure
hampered his ability to meet the evidence at trial, had a deleterious
effect on his trial strategy, or that it deprived him of the opportunity
to raise a valid challenge to the admissibility of evidence.
Allen, 145 Idaho at 185-86, 177 P.3d at 399-400 (emphasis original, citations
omitted).
At trial the prejudice claimed by Kramer was that he had not hired any
experts because he merely assumed that because it had not provided the
calibration documents the prosecution had elected not to use the breath test.
(Trial Tr., p. 10, Ls. 9-17; p. 11, Ls. 13-19.) The trial court was not required to
accept such a dubious claim, and apparently did not.
On appeal Kramer cites the fact that the first sample he provided was
invalid for testing and the fact that that the officer did not have personal
knowledge of what testing solution had been placed in the machine, and argues
he was "hampered in his ability to challenge the admissibility and reliability of the
breath test by the untimely disclosure of the breath test certificates." (Appellant's
brief, p. 15.) He fails, however, to articulate how the timing of the disclosure
affected his ability to prepare to address these issues at trial. (Appellant's brief,
pp. 12-15.) Indeed, he fails to make any connection whatsoever between the
7

timing of the disclosure and either the validity of the first sample or the officer's
personal knowledge regarding the simulator solution. Because Kramer has failed
to articulate, much less show, any prejudice related to the timing of the disclosure
of the calibration documents he has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.

11.
Kramer Has Failed To Show That Admission Of Documents Prepared In The
Regular Course Of Calibration Of The lntoxilyzer 5000 Violated The
Confrontation Clause

A.

Introduction
During the trial the state submitted, and the trial court admitted, State's

Exhibit 2. (Trial Tr., p. 131. L. 18 - p. 134, L. 2.) On appeal Kramer claims that
admission of State's Exhibit 2 violated his right to confront the witnesses against
him. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-20.) This argument fails for two reasons. First,
State's Exhibit 2 has not been included in the appellate record. Thus, Kramer
has failed to present an adequate record for appellate review of his claim.
Second, to the extent its contents can be gleaned from the record, State's Exhibit
2 consisted of documents kept in the normal course of business and related to
routine calibration of the lntoxilyzer 5000. Such documents, however, are not
testimonial and therefore did not trigger the right to confrontation.

B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing a claimed violation of the Confrontation Clause the

appellate court defers to the trial court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous,
but gives free review to the trial court's legal determinations. State v. Hooper,
145 Idaho 139,141,176 P.3d 911,913 (2007).
8

C.

Kramer's Claim Fails Because The Appellate Record Is Incomplete
The appellant has the burden of providing an adequate record to

substantiate his or her claims of error before the appellate court.

State v.

Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105, 803 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873, 702 P.2d 910, 911 (Ct. App. 1985).

"In the

absence of an adequate record on appeal, we will not presume error." State v.
Longoria, 133 Idaho 819, 823, 992 P.2d 1219, 1223 (Ct. App. 1999). "Missing
portions of the record must be presumed to support the action of the trial court."
~

at 823, 992 P.2d at 1223 (citing Kugler v. Drown, 119 Idaho 687, 690, 809

P.2d 1166, 1169 (Ct. App. 1991)).
State's Exhibit 2 is not currently in the appellate record. (See R., p. 279
(listing no exhibits on clerks certificate).) From the parties' description the exhibit
apparently consists of a certification that the other documents are true and
correct copies; a certification that the lntoxilyzer 5000 device complies with state
standards; a certification from the manufacturer that the device complies with
federal standards; a certification that the simulator solution used in calibration
contained a certain percentage of alcohol; and a log of when the machine was
used to test breath samples. (Trial Tr., p. 87, L. 10 - p. 88, L. 18; p. 91, L. 24 p. 94, L. 12; p. 131, L. 20- p. 132, L. 21; p. 172, L. 11 - p. 174, L. 7. 1 ) The

1

The state is in no way stipulating or conceding that the representations of
Kramer's counsel about the nature or content of the exhibit were accurate. The
state is citing to those representations only by way of demonstrating the entirety
of the appellate record relating to the contents of State's Exhibit 2.
9

description provided is generally consistent with the contents of the state's
supplemental response to discovery. (See R., pp. 108-16.)
Kramer claims that admission of State's Exhibit 2 was error. (Appellant's
brief, pp. 15-18.) State's Exhibit 2 is not in the record before this Court. Kramer
invites this Court to review the documents attached to the state's discovery
response and assume that they are the same documents in State's Exhibit 2.
Such an assumption would not be appropriate. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho
482, 488, 211 P.3d 91, 97 (2009) (court will not presume error; absence of
diqgram, used for illustrative purposes only, prevented Court from reaching
question of whether defendant was detained).

Because Kramer has failed to

present an adequate record for appellate review, his claim must be rejected.

D.

Kramer Has Failed To Show That The Confrontation Clause Applies To
The Calibration Records Because They Are Not Testimonial
Even if the appellate record were adequate for review, Kramer has shown

no error. The Confrontation Clause applies to '"witnesses' against the accused in other words, those who 'bear testimony."' Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 51 (2004) (quotes original, citations omitted). "'Testimony,' in turn, is typically
'[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact."' l!;l (quotation and brackets original, citation omitted). Thus,
the underlying reasoning of Crawford is that the Confrontation Clause applies to
evidence that is the functional equivalent of bearing testimony against the
accused.
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The Supreme Court addressed what constitutes testimony in the area of
scientific or expert evidence in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, _

U.S. _ ,

129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009), where the Court held that notarized certificates, setting
forth the results of laboratory analysis determining that the substance possessed
by Melendez-Diaz was cocaine, were the equivalent of affidavits and therefore
testimonial.

kl

at 2530-32.

The Court stated, however, in response to the

dissent's assertion that calibration of scientific instruments would have to be
established by live testimony, that it was not holding, "and it is not the case, that
anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody,
authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in
person as part of the prosecution's case."

kl at 2532 n.1

(emphasis added); see

also id. at 2545 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Instead, "documents prepared in the
regular course of equipment maintenance may well qualify as nontestimonial
records." Id.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently addressed the
applicability of Crawford and Melendez-Diaz to documents showing calibration of
BAG testing devices.

Commonwealth v. Zeininger, 947 N.E.2d 1060 (Mass.

2011). After stating the legal standards set forth in Crawford and Melendez-Diaz,
id. at 1067-68, the court concluded that the Supreme Court of the United States
has drawn
a distinction between traditionally admissible business records and
testimony within the scope of the confrontation clause: "Business
and public records are generally admissible absent confrontation ...
because-having been created for the administration of an entity's
affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact
at trial-they are not testimonial."
11

~

at 1068-69 (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2539-40). The court then

concluded that certifications of the calibration of breath testing devices are
"outside the orbit of the 'common nucleus' of the various definitions of
'testimonial' set forth in Crawford." Zeininger, 947 N.E.2d at 1069. The court
drew a distinction between the affidavits that were direct proof of an element of
the crime in Melendez-Diaz and certificates of calibration that "bear only on the
admissibility or credibility" of breath test evidence.

~

"We agree with the Court

of Appeals of Oregon, which concluded that such records 'bear a more
attenuated relationship with conviction: They support one fact (the accuracy of
the machine) that, in turn, supports another fact that can establish guilt (blood
alcohol level)."'
2009)).

~

(quoting State v. Bergin, 217 P.3d 1087, 1089 (Or. App.

The certification records regarding calibration of the breath testing

instruments were in the nature of routine administrative records, rather than
direct proof of guilt, and were therefore not testimonial and not subject to
confrontation. Id. at 1069-70. 2
The reasoning of the Massachusetts Supreme Court is persuasive. The
Supreme Court of the United States has drawn a distinction between records of
routine and administrative functions, on one hand, and documents prepared for
proving a particular case, on the other, for purposes of determining what is
testimonial for purposes of application of the Confrontation Clause.

2

Here the

The Massachusetts Supreme Court also noted that, with one exception, other
courts that had considered the question had reached the same conclusion; that
records regarding calibration of testing devices are not testimonial. Zeininger,
947 N.E.2d at 1070 n.19 (and cases cited).
12

certificates that the lntoxilyzer 5000 was manufactured in conformance with
national standards, that the simulator solutions contained the right ratios of
alcohol, and the log showing number of uses for purposes of doing routine
maintenance and re-calibration were not created with the idea of prosecuting
Kramer.

They were merely documentation of routine acts to make sure the

breath testing machine was in good working order.
testimonial and did not require confrontation.

As such, they were not

Kramer has therefore failed to

show a violation of his confrontation rights in the admission of State's Exhibit 2.

E.

Even If There Had Been Error The Error Was Harmless
"Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial

rights shall be disregarded." I.C.R. 52.

Error is harmless when there is no

reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the jury's verdict and the Court
can "declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v.
Fernandez, 124 Idaho 381, 383-84, 859 P.2d 1389, 1391-92 (1993) (citations
omitted).
As noted above, the evidence of calibration goes only to the admissibility
or credibility of the lntoxilyzer 5000 results.

Commonwealth v. Zeininger, 947

N. E.2d 1060, 1069 (Mass. 2011 ). Admissibility was a question for the court and
not the jury, so any alleged confrontation violation would not have caused the
exclusion of the BAG test results.

I.R.E. 104(a) (preliminary questions of

admissibility determined by court). The calibration evidence was irrelevant to the
open container conviction. Given the overwhelming evidence that Kramer was
either over the .08 BAG threshold (State's Exhibit 1; Trial Tr., p. 134, Ls. 22-24)
13

or under the influence (State's Exhibit 3; Trial Tr., p. 52, L. 2 - p. 74, L. 12; p. 99,
Ls. 2-12), the lack of calibration evidence would not have affected the outcome of
the trial as to the DUI count either.

Thus, any error in allowing the jury to

consider the calibration documents was harmless.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Kramer's conviction for
DUI and open container.

DATED this 1st day of November, 2011.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of November, 2011, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
DOUGLAS D. PHELPS
Phelps & Associates
2903 North Stout Road
Spokane, WA 99206

KKJ/pm

14

